CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 245

5.

MIDDLE EAST: SUEZ CANAL

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THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that his estimate of the length of time for

which we must expect the Suez Canal to remain closed was pessimistic.

While

the engineering task involved in clearing and opening the Canal could be

accomplished in six to eight weeks, the indications were that the Egyptians

would keep the Canal closed for as long as they could, because they regarded

it as their strongest bargaining counter, so that the Canal might well remain

closed to British shipping, if not to all shipping, for six to twelve months;

and prudent planning should proceed on that assumption. At the same time it should be recognised that the situation could suddenly change, A telegram (No. 2480 of 27th July) just received from our Ambassador in Washington

reported evidence of continuing Russian efforts to persuade the Arab countries

to accept a balanced Security Council resolution which would enable progress

to be made towards resolving the crisis. At present the opposition of extremist Arab countries (not on this occasion including the United Arab Republic (UAR)) had frustrated this initiative, but it seemed likely that the Russians would persist; should there be any collective Arab response

there was reason to think that the Israelis would be ready to play their part

by some withdrawal of forces if this would secure a peace settlement.

›

Meanwhile, however, it would be useful for officials to examine the

implications for our interests of the continued closure of the Canal, in

terms of: our oil supplies; other imports; exports; invisible earnings;

our shipping industry; and the total effect on our balance of payments.

Officials should also examine ways of reducing our dependence on the Canal.

In discussion the following main points were made

(a) There seemed no chance that either side would make any move towards the opening of negotiations before the next meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Israel was no doubt waiting to see whether the Arab countries

would make any move. We could hardly expect that Israel would take any

step towards withdrawing forces from the Sinai Peninsula before she had

achieved her object of recognition by the Arab states and negotiations with

them. Meanwhile, there seemed to be no productive initiative that we could

take;

and none of our allies favoured an initiative before the Security

Council met.

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